chrome:Cross-origin object leak via fetch

- AV AC AU C I A
发布: 2025-04-13
修订: 2025-04-13

### VULNERABILITY DETAILS The promise returned by `fetch.call(crossOriginWindow)` is created in the cross-origin context. Direct cross-origin scripting is not possible because cross-origin function constructors don't work anymore ( issue 541703 ). But the attacker can e.g. call other functions of the cross-origin page. ### VERSION Chrome Version: 56.0.2891.0 canary (64-bit). Does not reproduce in stable; the promise is generated in the correct context there. Possibly commit [1] might be the cause, but I'm not sure. Operating System: Windows 10 ### REPRODUCTION CASE See attachments. Save in the same directory, then open parent.html. The sandboxed child is able to call `Function.foo` of the parent page. In fact, I found a way to bypass the function constructor restrictions. That is, UXSS is possible. The trick is to create and resolve a promise, and call the function constructor in the `then` callback: ```js var parent_Promise = fetch.call(parent).constructor; var parent_Function =...

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